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femmes comme persécution du fait de « l’appartenance à
un groupe social », des problèmes analytiques sont inévitables.
Ces problèmes surgissent parce que notre système de
détermination ne veut pas accepter la réalité que les
femmes sont persécutées dans le monde entier du fait
même de leur sexe. L’auteure demande que la persécution
sexiste soit incluse dans la définition canadienne du droit
d’asile, afin d’harmoniser cette définition avec d’autres
protocoles des droits de la personne au niveau national et
international, qui reconnaissent déjà l’importance des
droits de la personne des femmes.
In September of last year, one of the demands made tothe Canadian government by the World March ofWomen was that persecution based on gender be in-
cluded as a ground for claiming refugee status in Canada
under the Immigration Act. Despite requests by women’s
organizations across Canada for the explicit inclusion of
this protection, an overhaul of our immigration and refu-
gee law contained in Bill - (which died on the Order
Paper with the election call last fall) and the new Bill -
preserve the refugee definition in the proposed new Im-
migration and Refugee Protection Act. When members
of the Canadian Women’s March Committee met with
Citizenship and Immigration Minister Elinor Caplan to
discuss the Women’s March demands in October of last
year, she rejected out of hand any amendment of the
refugee grounds to make them more inclusive, confident
that the Canadian gender guidelines and current legal in-
Abstract
This case comment takes a critical Canadian look at
gender-based refugee claims in light of the recent United
States Board of Immigration Appeals decision in re R-A-.
The author points out that many of the obstacles for
women who are refugee claimants in the United States,
which are highlighted in re R-A-, also exist in Canada. She
argues that when we are forced to define women’s gender
persecution as persecution on account of “membership in a
particular social group,” analytical problems are inevitable.
These problems arise because our refugee definition does
not acknowledge that women are persecuted worldwide
simply because of their gender. The author urges that
gender persecution be specifically included in the Canadian
refugee definition, to bring the definition in line with other
domestic and international human rights instruments,
which already recognize the importance of women’s human
rights.
Résumé
Cette étude de cas porte un regard critique canadien sur les
demandes d’asile basées sur des considérations de sexe à la
lumière de la décision récente de la Section d’Appels de la
Commission sur l’immigration des États Unis dans l’affaire
re R-A-. L’auteure souligne que beaucoup des obstacles
confrontant les femmes revendiquant le statut de réfugié
aux États Unis, et qui ont été mis en exergue dans l’affaire
re R-A-, sont aussi présents au Canada. Elle soutient que
lorsqu’on est forcé de définir la persécution sexiste des
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terpretations from our courts provide adequate protec-
tion for refugee women fearing gender-based persecution.
Over the past twenty years there have been significant
advances in feminist legal thought and scholarship. A
critical examination of refugee law from a feminist per-
spective would have been unthinkable at the time of the
drafting of the   Convention relating to the Status
of Refugees, or the  Protocol. Indeed, even by ,
the date of publication of the  Handbook on Procedures
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, no mention
was made of women, sex, or gender as grounds for being
recognized as Convention refugees, despite the fact that
women and children have always represented the major-
ity of the world’s refugees, and women’s refugee experi-
ences can be markedly different from those of men.
In addition to those women who are officially counted
as refugees in the refugee camps or claiming refugee sta-
tus around the world, there are countless others who are
routinely tortured, beaten, humiliated, mutilated, impris-
oned, and even murdered by their spouses. This occurs in
some cases with state sanction, in other cases when the
state is unable or unwilling to provide protection, or
where the state has abdicated responsibility for the pro-
tection of women. Extreme domestic violence is one of
the most widespread human rights violations committed
against women, committed against women of all na-
tional, ethnic, and social origins, from all economic con-
ditions.
Despite the fact that women comprise the majority of
the world’s refugees and that their refugee experience is
different from the male refugee experience, it is only re-
cently that the magnitude and the specificity of women’s
refugee experience has begun to be acknowledged.
In  the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees adopted guidelines for the protection of refugee
women. In the following year, in Canada, a Saudi woman
identified by the pseudonym “Nada” was denied refugee
status, but her case became the rallying point and eventu-
ally the catalyst for change in the treatment of gender-
based refugee claims. The strength of public support for
Nada, together with a growing international recognition
of the nature of women’s persecution, led to the intro-
duction of gender guidelines in Canada for the interpre-
tation of the refugee definition. These guidelines permit
an interpretation of the refugee definition in a way that
incorporates the gender-related claims of women into the
enumerated grounds in the Convention. Other Western
countries have followed Canada’s example of issuing
non-binding gender guidelines, while maintaining the
original enumerated grounds for claiming refugee status
in the Convention. In , the  Department of Justice
issued gender guidelines ( guidelines) for officers ad-
judicating women’s asylum claims, publicly acknowledg-
ing the Canadian lead.
Both Canada and the United States chose to address
gender concerns without amending the refugee defini-
tion to include gender or sex as a ground for claiming
refugee status. In both jurisdictions the refugee definition
is incorporated into domestic legislation, making change
possible at the domestic level, but such change has never
been likely to be politically acceptable to the electorate.
Those who oppose opening the definition to add gender
or sex argue that to do so would constitute an open invi-
tation to those who wish to narrow the existing defini-
tion. Like the Canadian Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration, they argue that such a risk is not warranted
when the existing definition is subject to an interpreta-
tion that recognizes claims based on gender.
Notwithstanding this optimism, there remain a num-
ber of analytical difficulties that arise in gender-based
claims when we try to fit the specificity of gender perse-
cution into the existing categories of refugee persecution.
Because the definition has not been amended to add sex
or gender, claimants must show that their persecution is
“on account of” their political opinion, race, nationality,
or religion, or because of membership in a particular so-
cial group. These difficulties were recently starkly high-
lighted in the American Board of Immigration Appeal
case In re R-A-. Notwithstanding  Attorney General
Janet Reno’s vacation of the decision in the last days of
the Clinton administration, the case should serve as a
wake up call to other jurisdictions that have adopted
non-binding guidelines to address issues raised by gen-
der-based refugee claims.
In re R-A-, a majority of ten members sitting on the
Board of Immigration Appeals () overturned the refu-
gee acceptance of a Guatemalan woman under circum-
stances where they acknowledged the “heinous abuse she
suffered and still fears from her husband in Guatemala.”
The credibility of the claimant was unimpeached, and the
litany of torture and abuse she recounted, both physical
and sexual, from her violent and domineering husband
were fully accepted by the Immigration judge at first in-
stance. These findings were undisturbed on appeal.
Indeed, the  stated, “We struggle to describe how
deplorable we find the husband’s conduct to have been,”
and, “The respondent in this case has been terribly
abused and has a genuine and reasonable fear of returning
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to Guatemala.” On the facts proven at the original hear-
ing, the  was prepared to accept that the treatment ex-
perienced was “persecution,” and the claimant had made
serious efforts to seek state protection, including com-
plaints to the police and court applications, which had
proved fruitless. The difficulty for the board arose, how-
ever, because the claimant failed, in their view, to demon-
strate a link between her persecution and any perceived
or imputed political opinion, or because of her member-
ship in any particular social group.
The In re R-A- case was highly controversial, in the
general media and within the refugee community. Schol-
ars criticized the findings of the board and claimed that
its decision brought into question the commitment of
Immigration and Naturalization to its own gender guide-
lines and raised serious concerns about the nature and
scope of protection for victims of gender-based persecu-
tion. Karen Musalo, director of the Center for Gender &
Refugee Studies in the United States, commented,
The decision in re R-A- also goes against a number of sig-
nificant developments and trends. It is counter to the prin-
ciples expressed in the  Gender Guidelines, inconsistent
with the Board’s own decision in Kashinga, contrary to the
jurisprudence of countries such as Canada and the United
Kingdom, and a repudiation of fundamental understand-
ings regarding the nature of women’s human rights, and the
relationship between these rights and principles of asylum.
In this case comment, I start from the premise that the
 decision in re R-A- was incorrect and that the strong
dissent sets out a preferable interpretation of the law that
relies upon domestic law, international human rights in-
struments, and the United States  guidelines. While
this comment discusses some of these interpretation is-
sues, they are not the primary focus. Instead, I am more
interested in what this decision would have meant for
women seeking protection from severe spousal abuse if it
had not been vacated, or if the interpretation of the defi-
nition employed gains wider acceptance. Were the barri-
ers the  erected so high that they are insurmountable
for most refugee claimants seeking protection from se-
vere spousal abuse? Are women seeking protection from
spousal abuse at peril of a similar setback here in Canada?
The Immigration Judge’s Decision
The Immigration judge found that the claimant was a
member of the social group of “Guatemalan women who
have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male
companions who believe that women are to live under
male domination.” She found this group was both cognis-
able and cohesive, as members shared the common and
immutable characteristics of gender and the experience
of having been intimately involved with a male compan-
ion who practices male domination through violence.
Further, the judge found that when the claimant resisted
her husband’s violent acts, she demonstrated the political
opinion “that women should not be dominated by men,”
and that her husband was motivated to commit the abuse
because of the political opinion he believed her to hold.
On appeal to the , both of these findings were over-
turned.
The  Decision: Political Opinion
The  rejected the basis of the claimant’s refugee claim
upon political opinion, finding that her actions did not
illustrate a political opinion—implied or imputed—as
there was no evidence that her husband was motivated to
harm her on the basis of any political opinion. Because
she failed to articulate a political opinion, they were not
convinced that she even had a political opinion at all. The
Immigration Appeal Board noted,
At the onset, the respondent never testified that she under-
stood the abuse to be motivated by her political opinion or
membership in a group of any description. Her husband
never articulated such motivation, and she does not seem to
have perceived it independent of the legal arguments now
being advanced on her behalf. The dissent itself does not
claim that either the respondent or her husband understood
the abuse to be motivated, even in part, by the respondent’s
political opinion or social group membership.
The record indicates that the respondent’s husband
harmed the respondent regardless of what she actually be-
lieved or what he thought she believed . . .
The respondent’s account of what her husband told her
may well reflect his own view of women and, in particular,
his view of the respondent as his property to do with as he
pleased. It does not, however, reflect that he had any under-
standing of the respondent’s perspective or that he even
cared what the respondent’s perspective may have been. Ac-
cording to the respondent, he told her, “You’re my woman
and I can do whatever I want,” and, “You’re my woman, you
do what I say,” and that he “would hit or kick me whenever
he felt like it.”
Nowhere in the record does the respondent recount her
husband saying anything relating to what he thought her
political views to be, or that the violence towards her was at-
tributable to her actual or imputed beliefs. Moreover, this is
not a case where there is meaningful evidence that this re-
spondent held or evinced a political opinion, unless one as-
sumes that the common human desire not to be harmed or
abused is in itself a “political opinion.” The record before us
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simply does not indicate that the harm arose in response to
any objections made by the respondent to her husband’s
domination over her. Nor does it suggest that his abusive
behaviour was dependent in any way on the views held by
the respondent. Indeed, his senseless actions started at the
beginning of their marriage and continued whether or not
the respondent acquiesced in his demands. The record re-
flects that, once having entered into this marriage, there was
nothing the respondent could have done or thought that
would have spared her (or indeed would have spared any
other woman unfortunate enough to have married him)
from the violence he inflicted.
To accept that R-A-’s resistance, made manifest by her
flight from abuse and her search for help and protection,
is the expression of a political opinion requires one to un-
derstand the role that violence against women plays in
the perpetuation of a male-dominated society. Unfortu-
nately, it is only recently that domestic violence has been
recognized explicitly as a human rights issue. Human
Rights Watch, in its Brazilian report in , charged for
the first time that a state was complicit in the crime of
domestic violence because of its failure to prosecute it
equally with other crimes, and to guarantee women the
fundamental civil and political right to equal protection
before the law without regard to sex. In the broader
sense, women’s struggle to overcome the social, legal, and
cultural barriers to equality has been waged with a devel-
oping appreciation for the role that violence plays in the
maintenance of a male-dominated society. If one has an
appreciation of this context, and actually accepts it, then
the refugee claimant’s flight from her abusive husband
can be characterized as the expression of a political opinion.
As Rhonda Copeland points out,
Indeed, domestic violence against women is systemic and
structural, a mechanism of patriarchal control of women
that is built upon male superiority and female inferiority,
sex-stereotyped roles and expectations, and the economic,
social and political predominance of men and dependency
of women. While the legal and cultural embodiments of pa-
triarchal thinking vary among different cultures, there is an
astounding convergence in regard to the basic tenets of pa-
triarchy and the legitimacy, if not necessity, of violence as a
mechanism of enforcing that system.
Notwithstanding the  comments, there was ample
evidence upon which the  could have found the neces-
sary connection between the political opinion and the ac-
tions of the abuser. Indeed, the  even touched on some
of these connections when they stated, “There is little
doubt that the respondent’s spouse believed that married
women should be subservient to their own husbands . . .
On the basis of this record, we perceive that the husband’s
focus was on the respondent because she was his wife.”
Clearly these statements indicate the spouse’s view of the
reason he believed he could abuse her. If that were not
enough, the dissent added further facts from the record
that should have been sufficient to situate the persecution
in a political context:
First, to assess motivation, it is appropriate to consider the
factual circumstances surrounding the violence. The factual
record reflects quite clearly that the severe beatings were di-
rected at the respondent by her husband to dominate and
subdue her, precisely because of her gender, as he inflicted
his harm directly on her vagina, sought to abort her preg-
nancy, and raped her.
These factual findings underpinned the dissent’s
analysis which led them to conclude that domestic vio-
lence is also a means by which men may systematically
destroy the power of women—a form of violence rooted
in the economic, social, and cultural subordination of
women.
The Claimant’s Failure to Articulate a Political
Opinion
Traditionally it was thought that “political opinion” ap-
plied only to those who had formal membership in a po-
litical party. However, in recent years we have adopted
the more general interpretation advocated by Goodwin-
Gill as “any opinion on any matter in which the machin-
ery of state, government, and policy may be engaged.”
We have also recognized that the political opinion need
not have been expressed, but can be perceived from the
claimant’s actions. Notwithstanding this expanded defi-
nition, in determining these claims there has always been
a focus on establishing the political opinion in the first
place. Even the  handbook notes,
It will, therefore, be necessary to establish the applicant’s
political opinion, which is at the root of his behaviour, and
the fact that it has led or may lead to the persecution that he
claims to fear.
This requirement to root out the political opinion of
the claimant led the  to require the articulation of the
political opinion by both the claimant and her abuser.
But realistically, how many women who are victims of
domestic violence, particularly those coming from coun-
tries where feminist scholarship and discussion are not
important components of the national debate, can be ex-
pected to articulate the significance of their personal situ-
ation in this wider political context? How many people
are able to transcend learned patterns of behaviour, to be
able to view individual behaviour in its broader social,
political, or cultural context? Moreover, how many Immi-
gration judges, board members, or members of the Board
of Immigration Appeals would be familiar with such
theories, much less accept them?
There is no doubt that part of the board’s difficulty in
characterising the claimant’s actions as political stems
from the traditional understanding that political acts are
intimately linked to public acts. Actions that are under-
stood to be political—both express and implied—take
place publicly, like organizing election rallies, running for
office, or expressing opinions on matters of state impor-
tance or the rights of citizens or workers. However, escape
from domestic abuse is rarely a public act and, signifi-
cantly, a woman’s defiance of male authority in the home
is rarely seen as political.
As Doreen Indra commented in a previous Refuge article,
The key criteria for being a refugee are drawn primarily
from the realm of public sphere activities dominated by
men. With regard to private sphere activities where women’s
presence is more strongly felt, there is primarily silence—si-
lence compounded by an unconscious calculus that assigns
the critical quality “political” to many public activities but
few private ones. Thus, state oppression of a religious mi-
nority is political, while gender oppression at home is not.
The Board of Immigration Appeals clearly character-
ized the harm suffered by the claimant as a private harm,
emphasizing how the abuse was directed against only the
claimant, not against other members of the public:
[T]he respondent fails to show how other members of the
group may be at risk of harm from him . . . but the record
indicates that the respondent suffered and feared intimate
violence only from her own husband . . . On the basis of this
record, we perceive that the husband’s focus was on the re-
spondent because she was his wife, not because she was a
member of some broader collection of women, however de-
fined, whom he believed warranted the infliction of harm . .
. Importantly, construing private acts of violence to be
qualifying governmental persecution, by virtue of the inad-
equacy of protection, would obviate, perhaps entirely, the
“on account of” requirement in the statute.
To emphasize the private nature of the harm, the
Board of Immigration Appeals went to great lengths to
decontextualize the behaviour of the claimant’s husband,
removing it entirely from the social and cultural context
within which he lived and which nourished his male
dominance. Ultimately, the  attributed the violence
solely to the abnormality of the abuser:
Other factors, ranging from jealousy to growing frustration
with his own life to simple unchecked violence tied to the
inherent meanness of his personality, are among the expla-
nations or motivations that may reasonably be inferred on
this record for the actions of the respondent’s husband. For
example, when the respondent resisted her husband’s de-
mands for sexual relations, he would accuse her of seeing
other men. Notably, he did not accuse her of harbouring
opinions hostile to his own or of being part of an abhorrent
group.
What this analysis ignores is that domestic violence is
hardly gender-neutral, being overwhelmingly initiated by
men against women. The very extent of the abuse—in
frequency and universality—attests to the underlying so-
cial origins and clearly suggests that it cannot be ex-
plained by a narrow examination of the abuser, or even
the abused. As the United Nations has noted,
There is no simple explanation for violence against women
in the home. Certainly, any explanation must go beyond the
individual characteristics of the man, the woman and the
family to look at the structure of relationships and the role
of society in underpinning that structure. In the end analy-
sis, it is perhaps best to conclude that violence against wives
is a function of the belief, fostered in all cultures, that men
are superior and that the women they live with are their
possessions or chattels that they can treat as they wish and
as they consider appropriate.
In the final analysis, the test for political opinion, and
for “on account of” political opinion articulated by the
board, constitutes an almost insurmountable hurdle for
most victims of spousal abuse. Not only must they prove
that they have suffered the abuse and that no state protec-
tion is available, they must also be able to fully situate
their abuse within the overall political context of their
own society and have communicated this sophisticated
analysis to their spouse. In other words, they would need
to be familiar with feminist scholarship, which argues
that in a sexually unequal society, physical and sexual co-
ercion that is based in an institution, such as the family, is
an abuse of social and sexual power and is used to under-
score women’s inferiority to men. Indeed, such a require-
ment would make mandatory reading of Susan
Brownmiller’s Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape
for female refugee claimants. It may not be enough that
Canadian courts have recognized the relationship be-
tween violence against women and the inequality of the
sexes, if the woman herself does not understand the rela-
tionship.
The individual refugee claimant must therefore be able
to articulate the symbolic significance of her resistance to
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or flight from abuse, within the context of her own pro-
foundly discriminatory society, which fails to guarantee
her the civil and political right of equal protection before
the law. Not only must she have understood her indi-
vidual predicament within this context, she must also
have somehow communicated her analysis to her perse-
cutor, so that there is a clear link between his abuse and
her political opinion, because the abuse must be “on ac-
count of” the political opinion.
What makes this scenario even more incredible is what
we know about the dynamics of spousal abuse itself. It
has been widely documented that the long-term effects of
prolonged physical and psychological abuse include low
self-esteem, lack of initiative, and passivity, belief that the
husband is all-powerful, depression, anxiety, and suicidal
ideation. As Leanne Walker documents, most battered
women strive to avoid conflict or provoking anger in
their abusers, a strategy that is incompatible with the type
of political discussions the Immigration Appeal Board
seems to require:
Often a woman may erroneously take responsibility for
starting a battering incident because she said something
that she should have known would provoke or anger the
man. Most battered women believe that if only they could
close their mouth when the man is tense, they would not be
battered.
The notion that a woman in this situation would actu-
ally confront her abusive spouse with her political analy-
sis of his abuse, and then provide him with the
opportunity to abuse her as a direct consequence of her
political analysis, is patently absurd.
The  Decision: Membership in a Particular
Social Group
In finding that R-A- was not part of the particular social
group of “Guatemalan women who have been involved
intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who be-
lieve that women are to live under male domination,” the
 was particularly concerned with whether this group
had “a voluntary associational relationship.”
Moreover, regardless of Ninth Circuit law, we find that the
respondent’s claimed social group fails under our own inde-
pendent assessment of what constitutes a qualifying social
group. We find it questionable that the social group adopted
by the Immigration Judge appears to have been defined
principally, if not exclusively, for purposes of this asylum
case, and without regard to the question of whether anyone
in Guatemala perceives this group to exist in any form
whatsoever. The respondent fits within the proposed group.
But the group is defined largely in the abstract. It seems to
bear little or no relation to the way in which Guatemalans
might identify subdivisions within their own society or oth-
erwise might perceive individuals either to possess or to lack
an important characteristic or trait. The proposed group
may satisfy the basic requirements of containing an immu-
table or fundamental individual characteristic. But, for the
group to be viable for asylum purposes, we believe there
must also be some showing of how the characteristic is un-
derstood in the alien’s society, such that we, in turn, may
understand that the potential persecutors in fact see persons
sharing the characteristic as warranting suppression or the
infliction of harm . . .
The respondent has shown neither that the victims of
spouse abuse view themselves as members of this group,
nor, most importantly, that their male oppressors see their
victimized companions as part of this group.
The board found that the four groups explicitly pro-
tected from persecution (on the grounds of race, religion,
nationality, and political opinion) exhibit characteristics
that typically separate factions within countries; are rec-
ognized as groupings in a particular society; comprise
members who understand their affiliation; and others in
that society understand the affiliation. Not surprisingly,
when the board applied these criteria to the social group
defined by the claimant in R-A-, they found that it could
not qualify as a social group.
What is particularly disturbing about this finding is
that it makes public acknowledgement a precondition for
recognition of a “particular social group” under the refu-
gee definition. Public acknowledgement of spousal abuse
has been extremely slow in coming, making this a signifi-
cant hurdle for many refugee women. In cases of spousal
abuse women often hide their shame, hospitals do not
record or report their injuries, police do not charge and
the judiciary do not prosecute or convict the offenders.
Because police don’t take or act on complaints and abus-
ers are not charged or convicted, the abuse is both socially
unacknowledged and statistically undocumented. Where
there is nothing but denial and silence surrounding spou-
sal abuse, how can there be social recognition of a group’s
existence, or any battered woman’s place in that group?
It is perhaps the final irony for refugee claimants who
are women seeking protection from spousal abuse, that
these women cannot, and will probably never be able to
satisfy the “voluntary associational” criteria required by
In re R-A- to prove membership in a social group. Spousal
abuse is invisible in many countries such as Guatemala,
where domestic assault and abuse are treated as private
matters, and men are free to batter and abuse their
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spouses with impunity. Unfortunately, ignorance of the
extent of spousal abuse most likely goes hand in hand
with a lack of support for female victims of spousal vio-
lence. How under these social conditions, where the
problem of domestic violence is not even acknowledged,
can any claimant ever show that there is social recogni-
tion of the group?
Further, it is widely acknowledged in the psychological
literature on domestic violence that jealousy, over-
possessiveness, and intrusiveness on the part of the
abuser tend to lead directly to the social isolation of bat-
tered women:
She may cease normal social activities, stop seeing her
friends and family, and become a prisoner in her own mind,
sometimes without even needing to actually lock the door,
although it is not unusual for the batterer to lock her in the
house without easy access to a telephone . . . The abuser at-
tempts to cut her off from “the world at large,” from social
supports and resources, and from people or organizations
to whom she might turn for help, understanding or solace.
If she is permitted social contacts, the abuser controls who
they are and monitors all aspects of the contacts. Increas-
ingly isolated, the woman becomes more vulnerable to the
abuser . . .
The isolation that many battered women experience has
many sources. Batterers tend to impose isolation on their
partners in order to keep power and control, to calm their
own fears of abandonment and feelings of intense, irratio-
nal jealousy, and to make it less likely that the victim will be
able to report the “secret” or find help. A battered woman
may believe that the less she and her abusive partner go out
into the world of other people, the less likely some social
event will trigger another violent outburst. Even when she
has a career in which she appears to function well, a bat-
tered woman may feel estranged from other people.
The expectation that a group, whose very persecution
is achieved and maintained through the imposition of ex-
treme social isolation, would have developed a collective
consciousness and social presence within the persecutor
society, is simply unrealistic. To make the measure of the
group’s very existence contingent upon social recogni-
tion, is to create an almost insurmountable barrier for
those women fleeing domestic violence.
Quite understandably, most claimants like R-A- will
probably never have articulated resistance in a traditional
political manner, nor have acted in concert with other
women opposed to the same or similar abusive practices.
It is probably also true for most women fleeing spousal
abuse that they are unaware that they are “a member of a
particular social group.” The irony is that those women
seeking protection from societies that provide the least
protection for women are predictably the same societies
where the level of consciousness and social group recog-
nition for abused women will be at its lowest. This leaves
the most vulnerable women with the least protection.
It is worth noting that the  also made some disturb-
ing comments preliminary to their main decision, on the
failure of the  Congress to change the refugee defini-
tion or the asylum statute at the time of the enactment of
other relief for women living in, or seeking to escape
from, abusive relationships:
The existence of derivative refugee status for spouses, as
well as these non refugee provisions for battered spouses,
raises the question of whether Congress intended or ex-
pected that our immigration laws, even in the refugee and
asylum context, would cover battered spouses who are leav-
ing marriages to aliens having no ties to the United States.
The failure to specifically amend the refugee definition
to include gender or sex, was seen as evidence that Con-
gress had no intention of changing the definition to in-
clude them.
New Immigration Regulations in the United States
Fortunately, following the In re R-A- decision, the Ameri-
can Department of Justice moved to amend the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service regulations to “clarify”
membership in a particular social group criteria and to
“remove certain barriers” to the recognition of spousal
abuse claims that arose in light of in re R-A-. The pro-
posed new rules cover a wide variety of issues related to
gender persecution, including social group membership,
nexus, the meaning of persecution, state action, and bur-
den of proof. The commentary on R-A-, however, accepts
the  analysis of political opinion and focuses solely on
the shortcomings of the social-group findings in that
case:
The Board’s analysis of the political opinion claim is consis-
tent with long-standing principles of asylum law and is not
altered by this rule. The Board reasoned that the abuse in
this case was not on account of the applicant’s political
opinion because there was no evidence that the applicant’s
husband was aware of the applicant’s opposition to male
dominance, or even that he cared what her opinions on this
matter were. Rather, he continued to abuse her regardless of
what she said or did. This portion of the decision is consis-
tent with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Elias-Zacharias,
supra, and with the Board’s own precedent that harm is not
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on account of political opinion when it is inflicted regard-
less of the victim’s opinion rather than because of that opin-
ion.
The proposed regulations would, however, alter the
“on account of” social group analysis undertaken by the
. The  found the violence that R-A- experienced
was not “on account of” her membership in a particular
social group, because there was no evidence that her hus-
band would harm other women who live with other abu-
sive partners. The proposed rules suggest that such group
targeting may arise in some cases, but it is not required as
a matter of law. Indeed, in some cases a persecutor may
target a victim because of a shared characteristic, even
though the persecutor acts against only the one victim.
The new rule makes the existence of multiple victims with
the same group characteristics relevant, but not required.
The final hurdle the rules address is societal recogni-
tion of the group as a prerequisite to finding a “particular
social group” under the refugee definition. The  found
the claimant had not shown that the group she said she
belonged to “is a recognized and understood to be a soci-
etal faction, or is otherwise a recognized segment of the
population within Guatemala.” When one is addressing
this issue, the proposed rules suggest that it is relevant to
consider whether there is evidence “about societal atti-
tudes toward group membership or about harm to group
members, including whether the institutions of the soci-
ety at hand offer fewer protections or benefits to mem-
bers of the group than to other members of society.”
This approach breathes life into the evidence intro-
duced in re R-A- (which was ignored by the majority of
the ) that the police did not respond to her calls for
help; that she appeared before a judge, but he told her he
would not interfere in domestic disputes; and that Guate-
malan society still tends to view domestic violence as a
family problem. This evidence illustrates that because the
claimant possesses a particular characteristic, harm in-
flicted on her may be tolerated by society, while it would
not be tolerated if inflicted on other members of society.
Overall, the proposed regulations are certainly an im-
provement, as the incorporation of these important prin-
ciples into regulations ensures their application in
refugee claims, in a manner which was never assured with
the non-binding gender guidelines. However, the propos-
als fall disappointingly short of resolving some of the un-
derlying problems in gender-based refugee claims.
Indeed, the new regulations specifically avoid creating a
categorical rule that a victim of domestic violence is or
can be a refugee on account of that experience or fear,
preferring a case-by-case approach. Further, they fail to
recognize gender alone as a qualifying category of “par-
ticular social group,” so that the difficulties inherent in
defining particular social group can be expected to persist.
Implications here in Canada
What are the implications of the R-A- decision for us here
in Canada? How well have our gender guidelines worked,
and are we at peril of a similar setback? Fortunately, with
Mr. Justice LaForest’s decision in Chan, our Supreme
Court has clearly ruled out the approach taken by the 
in re R-A-, on the issue of voluntary association.
In order to avoid any confusion on this point, let me state
incontrovertibly that a refugee alleging membership in a
particular social group does not have to be in a voluntary
association with other persons similar to him- or herself. Such
a claimant is in no manner required to associate, ally, or
consort voluntarily with kindred person. The association exists
by virtue of a common attempt made by its members to
exercise a fundamental human right.37
However, it is clear that the “voluntary association”
problem is not the only difficult analytical problem that
arises in gender-based claims. The dilemma of classifying
the social-group category has also bedevilled the Immi-
gration and Refugee Board in Canada. Here, because be-
ing part of the social group of women (who would fit the
four criteria set out by the ) is not enough, claimants
who are women have to show they are part of some par-
ticular sub-group of women. This has led the Canadian
Immigration and Refugee Board and the Federal Court to
define particular social group in tortuous ways; “Women
in China who have more than one child and face forced
sterilization”; Trinidadian women subject to wife
abuse”; “New citizens of Israel who are women recently
arrived from elements of the former Soviet Union and
who are not yet well integrated into Israel society, despite
the generous support offered by the Israeli government,
who are lured into prostitution and threatened and ex-
ploited by individuals not connected to the government,
and who can demonstrate indifference to their plight by
front line authorities to whom they would normally be
expected to turn to for protections”; “Women who have
been subjected to exploitation resulting in the violation
of the person and who, in consequences of the exploita-
tion have been tried, convicted and sentenced to impris-
onment.”
Such definitions, while they may benefit the individual
claimants by recognizing their refugee status, do little to
advance a comprehensive and consistent understanding
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of the refugee definition. Indeed, they create serious ana-
lytical difficulties. The  in re R-A- was rightly con-
cerned about the characterization of the group in that
case:
We find it questionable that the social group adopted by the
Immigration Judge appears to have been defined princi-
pally, if not exclusively, for purposes of this asylum case,
without regard to the question of whether anyone in Guate-
mala perceives this group to exist in any form whatsoever.
In addition to this problem, gender-based social-
group definitions often use the persecution experienced
by the woman to define the particular social group, a pro-
cess that leads inevitably to the circular reasoning de-
scribed by Todd Stewart Schenk:
Grounds for asylum are established when an applicant
proves persecution and connects that persecution to one of
the five categories contained in the definition of refugee.
This is a two-step approach. If a claimant attempts to define
the particular social group of which she is a member in
terms of persecution, as is the case when the particular so-
cial group is defined as “persecuted women,” the argument
takes on a circular characteristic. The claimant effectively
argues that she is persecuted due to membership in a perse-
cuted social group. What was initially a two-step approach
is now a one-step approach.
While the courts in Canada have for the most part ac-
cepted this circular reasoning to define social groups, it
has not been without difficulty. Indeed, as early as ,
the Federal Court of Appeal commented,
A question may be posed for the future: since, in this con-
text, persecution must be feared by reason of membership
in a particular social group, can fear of that persecution be
the sole distinguishing factor that results in what is at most
merely a social group becoming a particular social group?
Since Mayers was decided, the Canadian Supreme
Court in Ward has clearly stated the characterization of a
particular social group should not be made on the basis
of the persecution feared, leaving open to attack all of
these ingenious social-group formulations in gender
cases, which are necessitated by our failure to recognize
gender as an enumerated ground in its own right.
Unfortunately, judicial supervision of the Canadian
Convention Refugee Determination Division () of
the Immigration and Refugee Board is strictly limited.
There is no statutory right of appeal from a negative refu-
gee determination, only a limited judicial review with
leave of the Federal Court. If leave is granted—and it is
granted rarely—the standard of review for a  deci-
sion is “patently unreasonable.” This means the court
will determine only if the  determination was rea-
sonably open to it, not whether the  interpretation
of the Convention definition is strictly speaking correct.
This limited review produces two distinct results for gen-
der-based claims: few definitive pronouncements on the
correct interpretation of the law, and conflicting  in-
terpretations of the law that are never reviewed. Unfortu-
nately, successive law-student surveys of  gender
decisions clearly illustrate these consequences, as they
show an inconsistent application of the gender guide-
lines, more influenced by preference of individual board
member than consistent legal analysis. When coupled
with the lack of judicial supervision, which might correct
this inconsistency, there can be no doubt that problems
exist for claimants making gender-based claims.
Many of the problems that arose in re R-A-, and in oth-
ers that we see here in Canada, would not arise if gender
were a specific ground for claiming refugee status. If such
a recognition were granted, no longer would refugee
claimants have to show, on a case-by-case basis, that they
are part of some exotic “particular social group,” or that
their battle against domestic abuse is part of a larger po-
litical struggle. The insistence upon the construction of
new “particular social group” categories that can accom-
modate gender persecution, treats gender persecution as
if it were somehow a temporary or isolated event, instead
of the widespread, socially, culturally, and politically
sanctioned persecution that it is.
While the   gender guidelines, and the Canadian
and American guidelines that followed, were undoubt-
edly groundbreaking at the time, no one can argue that
they have been entirely successful. The difficulties high-
lighted by In re R-A- and our own difficulties with circu-
lar reasoning, and the inconsistent application of the
guidelines are but some of the problems. Notwithstand-
ing the optimism of the Minister of Citizenship about the
adequacy of the gender guidelines, these problems are
symptomatic of the failure to recognize persecution on
account of gender as a violation of human rights. Unfor-
tunately, without recognition of gender as a sixth refugee
category, these and other analytical problems will persist,
inevitably compromising our ability to comprehensively
protect refugee women.
The fiftieth anniversary of the  is perhaps an
auspicious time to consider changing the refugee defini-
tion to explicitly add gender persecution. This change
would bring the  Convention definition of refugee in
line with other Canadian and international human rights
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instruments that already recognize the importance of
women’s human rights. To add gender to the definition
would formally recognize the worldwide systematic and
institutionalized persecution of women on the basis of
their gender and send a clear message that discriminatory
treatment of women in the refugee process will no longer
be tolerated.
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